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ABSTRACT 
 In the modern age, Sunni communities are often claimed to be in a moment of 
crisis. However, despite outward arguments about this crisis, Sunni communities are 
more accurately described as within a state of transformation. By analyzing constructions 
of authority from Sayyid Qutb, the clerical establishment of Saudi Arabia, and the greater 
American Muslim communities, Sunni theology is best seen as seeking out methods to 
transform and re-center authority within Sunni communities.  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Chapter One: Introduction 
 Authority is often seen as a complicated issue in modern Sunni Islam, or more 
essentially who is allowed to represent the communities of Sunni Islam. The Sunni 
traditions boasts multiple jurisprudences, spans across multiple continents, and yet is 
often centered on the practices and rituals of Arab Sunnis. In the contemporary era, Sunni 
Islam is often spoke of as if there is a growing crisis of authority, that there is some 
metaphorical termite gnawing away at the foundation of the faith itself. The supposed 
reasons for this fracture range from globalization, secularism, the growing 
disillusionment with the traditional model of Islamic authority, or the suppression of local 
practices and rituals by status quo leaders in various nations. Yet, despite these myriad 
criticisms, many Sunni communities in the modern era continue to discuss and move their 
ideas of Sunni authority forward. These discussions and disputes within these 
communities have brought forth lasting and influential new ways of understanding the 
role of Islam on the human world, specifically because of these communities’ desire to 
interact and accept novel ideas outside the traditions that held authority within the 
community in history.  
 The later 20th century created new drives for Sunnis to re-understand and re-
interpret Islam and who draws authority from it from generation to generation comes 
from a new issue of the modern era. The modern era created new pressures on Muslims 
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leaders, communities, and religious authorities to secure and legitimate their own 
authority for their own populations. The rise of the internet and global digital media 
allowed Sunni communities to interact on more profound and intricate levels despite 
separations in language, geography, or culture. Previous authorities were able to be 
compared and shared, and the the increasingly globalized world put Sunnis in more 
contact with other Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These changing social conditions put 
pressure on Sunni theorists to explain and justify certain authority models that existed in 
the time. While a multiplicity of authority constructions were created and strained, there 
are three authority paths that seem to have gained traction and continue to influence 
subsequent ideas of authority within some Sunni Muslim communities. One major path is 
the entire rejection of the traditional clerical-theological establishment in favor of a non-
establishment thinker. The Egyptian theorist Sayyid Qutb’s writing is a useful case-study 
into this specific mentality about the future of Islamic practice for the modern era. He 
also represents a radical re-orienting of Islamic interpretation specifically because Qutb is 
anti-establishment, anti-traditional, and seeks to move beyond the idea of a religious elite. 
Meanwhile, another major path is that of the Saudi Arabian clerical apparatus and its 
relationship to the state.  
 This path is important to analyze specifically because it takes the idea of a state-
religion relationship to one of its farthest conclusions, and can be used to extrapolate and 
partially understand how some Sunni religious establishments interact with their state 
governments. Also, the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine is a growing influence within the global 
Muslim world and understanding its dynamics from the original center of Wahhabi-
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Salafism within Saudi Arabia provides context on how it may be formatted to other 
nations and communities. Finally, a growing number of Muslims exist semi-comfortably 
outside of traditionally Muslim localities and as such exist in a more multi-cultural, 
complex religious environment than many of their fellow Muslims that reside in Muslim-
majority countries. American Muslims serve as newly influential case study for these 
Muslims that reside in larger non-Muslim communities and nation-states specifically 
because of the United States’s complex relationship with Islam itself. Understanding how 
American Muslims interpret authority can then also shed light on how other Muslim 
communities in Muslim-minority countries may interact both with their fellow Muslims 
and their neighboring non-Muslims.  
 In order to best understand these specific case studies and how they may influence 
the modern Sunni world and its ongoing theorization, I have found it helpful to embrace 
an version of Max Weber’s authority construction models. Weber states that there are 
three major ideas of how authority is gained and created within communities.  There is 1
the charismatic leader, the person capable of intense and powerful connection to masses 
of people and able to inspire trust and loyalty through sheer force of character.  There is 2
the traditional leader, who bases their authority on the long-standing traditions and 
cultural standards that have already granted the pre-requisites for this person to be an 
 Albarghouthi, Ali. "Authority and Representation in North America: The Ijtihad Criteria and the 1
Construction of New Religious Authority." Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 13, no. 1 (2011): 
19.
 ibid 202
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authority at all.  Then there is the legal-rational leader, who does not seek to construct 3
and maintain authority through any independent action on their own but instead by 
strictly adhering to and interpreting the formal laws and norms within a society itself. 
Now, these categories are helpful for understanding general authority construction but do 
not entirely format well to the unique environment of Islam.  
 As a result, I have chosen to understand Weber as foundational influence for 
specific categories of Islamic authority construction. There is the professionally educated 
Muslim authority, where the authority is granted through their ability to speak about 
multiple different ideologies and able to succinctly communicate why Islam continues to 
be the correct response for the modern world. They gain their authority through their 
ability to understand Islam as a worldview and less as a purely theological exercise. 
There is the traditional-legal Muslim authority, where authority is granted through the 
ability to be traditionally trained in Islamic jurisprudence and to speak eloquently on the 
various laws imbedded within the Qur’an and subsequently the hadith and the sunnah. 
They gain and maintain authority through the ability to project Islam as a uniquely 
religious enterprise that influences all aspects of a person’s daily life and practice. Then 
there is a semi-racialized Muslim authority, where authority is gained and maintained 
through a theoretical lens that places Muslim as a identity marker in a similar way to race 
and ethnicity. These leaders arise through community influence and ability to speak 
within the community, as well as between the community and other non-Muslim 
 ibid 203
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communities. This is a growing authority model in the wake of the Muslim diaspora and 
their rootedness in non-Muslim majority nations and the need to simultaneously form 
community identity while responding to outside cultural pressure. 
  In order to best analyze and understand how these authority models interact and 
influence Muslim communities, I primarily seek to understand these authority models 
through the texts and writings of influential thinkers within these models. Authority is a 
fluid concept that is in perpetual need to be negotiated between leaders and the led.  
Therefore, it is needed to engage with these specific thinkers and communities on their 
own merits based on their writings and textual communications rather than through other 
methods. Text is a powerful method of transmission within communities and the modern 
age’s ability to expand into digital spaces means that writings can be accessed rather 
easily and ideologically traced from their inception to the modern era. Further, 
understanding the texts and the ideological rhetoric espoused by these specific 
communities and thinkers then allows for a analytic where the abstract theory of the 
writing can be traced to concrete practice in everyday life for Muslim communities 
engaging with these particular authority constructions. This methodology comes from the 
precept that Islam is a religion firmly embedded in an interpreted practice of textual 
analysis itself. Much of Islamic practice comes from the analysis of a text (the Qur’an) 
and therefore Islam can be in some ways defined as the attempt to extrapolate textual 
analysis into pure practice. These authority models (professional/anti-establishment, 
state-religion establishment cooperations, and racialized community formation) also 
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engage on a similar method, working to interpret a text and then place that interpretation 
into writing itself that can then be interpreted and enacted yet further.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 Authority within Sunni communities is a growing research interest in the field of 
religious studies specifically because of the complex relationship Sunni Islam maintains 
with the theory of authority. Unlike Shia Islam with its relatively hierarchical cleric 
structure and emulation models, Sunni communities are more fluid in granting authority 
due to the foundational idea of consensus within the Sunni theological model. However, 
the Sunni theological model also allows for different authority models to be constructed 
and implemented due to the nature of community consensus and who is considered part 
of the community. This idea of a consensus is often what drives research on Sunni 
authority construction, rather than looking to how specific ideologies, theories, or 
individuals may be able to influence larger sections of the community into changing what 
exactly is now considered consensus. This modern understanding of consensus can best 
be described as the need to transform and relocate authority, rather than remove, 
delegitimate, or decentralize Sunni authority models. 
 For example, Robinson’s “Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?” is an attempt to 
understand why exactly there seems to be a growing divide across the Sunni global 
community in the modern era. Robinson’s central argument revolves around the idea that 
the traditional methods of Qur’anic interpretation and creation of authority are in direct 
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conflict with the modern democratization process.  He draws a timeline by citing the 4
influences of European colonization of the 19th century first removing aspects of 
authority from the traditional Islamic clerical structure of various Muslim communities.  5
He furthers this argument by continuing the timeline into the 20th century, showing that 
lay interpretation grew as information was expanded and more communities were able to 
access that information.  Robinson argues that this is the final crack in “traditional” 6
Islam’s foundational authority and that this may be “a cause of despair or a source of 
hope.”  While Robinson does accurately cite the growing literacy and access of the 7
Qur’an in indigenous languages as one major influence on changing authority, he falls 
into a trap of assuming that there was a status quo Islam that was accepted broadly in the 
greater Sunni community before the modern era. “Traditional” Islam is more accurately 
described as authoritative Islam, or the Islamic interpretation that was able to be enforced 
by political leaders of various stripes. Therefore, traditional Islam is not the orthodox or 
authoritative Islam for all communities, and the growing Qur’anic access for the lay 
Muslim is not a crisis of authority, but a transformation of authority. Authority is innately 
a construct, and therefore it cannot be entirely lost, only moved or transported to different 
centers within society. Robinson’s question is quite similar to many researchers, but his 
answer is quite different. Robinson implies that there was an abstract universal authority 
 Robinson, Francis. "Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?" Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 4
19, no. 3 (2009): 345.
 ibid 3475
 ibid 3466
 ibid 3397
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within the Sunni theology before the modern era, whereas some researchers argue the 
opposite. 
 Consensus and the ideas of community within authority are intertwined and what 
Robinson seems to miss on, Peter Mandaville gets closer. In “Globalization and the 
Politics of Religious Knowledge”, Mandaville is quite insistent that there has never been 
a singular authoritative center of Islam throughout its long history and that globalization 
should be seen instead as an attempt to pluralize knowledge for the global Muslim 
community.  The article argues that pluralizing knowledge, at least for Islam, is not 8
simply a process to seek out new interpretations within the body of historical 
jurisprudence or even from within the Qur’an. It is instead a process by Muslims to 
recenter the normative bases of Islam itself. Mandaville also quite articulately argues that 
this normative base reconfiguration is due to the ever growing issue of globalization, 
where many Muslims live with “semi-diasporic identities-in-limbo” and need new centers 
of authority that can be easily accessed no matter where they are.  These decentralized 9
bases seem more accurate than Robinson’s authority crisis, yet still do not entirely reveal 
the fact that the modern era is not attempting to decentralize authority, but focus it. 
Mandaville writes from a perspective that does not include the increasingly localized 
authority in Saudi Arabia’s ‘ulama or the unique mixture of American Islamic authority 
that in many ways could only survive in the United States. Globalization has not 
 Mandaville, Peter. "Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge." Theory, Culture & 8
Society 24, no. 2 (2007): 102.
 ibid 1079
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decentralized Islamic authority, but instead allowed for authority to become local, where 
authority can shift rapidly based on the social constructions that shape authority in a 
specific community. Yet, both Mandaville and Robinson see authority as this passive 
process that happens to Sunni communities rather than created by Sunni communities. 
Very little focus is given to the idea of specific leaders or authority figures within 
authority construction. They instead imply that all Sunni communities absorb opinions 
through osmosis and organically spur consensus without personality or theory 
differences. 
 Yet Sayyid Qutb, one of the most prominent and well known Muslim theorists, is 
usually acknowledged for his unique theories of Islamic authority and its influence on 
Sunni communities, predominantly within Egypt. However, much of the characterization 
of Qutb is based around his supposed anti-authority, partial anarchic theology. Ana Belen 
Soage refutes this view and sees Sayyid Qutb outside of the traditional intellectual 
models that hold him as an anti-authority, near-anarchical Muslim radical. Soage argues 
that Qutb’s theology and theorizing is the result of a very specific combat between Qutb 
and the Egyptian government.  She argues that Qutb’s philosophy was shaped primarily 10
while he was imprisoned by the Nasr regime in the mid-1950s and became radical 
through his relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood while he was imprisoned.   11
 Soage, Ana Belén. "Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb." 10
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10, no. 2 (2009): 192.
 ibid 194-19611
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 This is not to state that she sees his theology as a merely political vendetta against 
the Egyptian government and Nasr, but she presents his theology as a form of revelation 
from his experiences at the hands of a nominally non-Muslim secular government in his 
home country. Soage’s projection of his philosophy into the modern era as a distinct birth 
of Islamism for the modern era seems relatively accurate and succinct, also portraying his 
Islamist political theology as a closed system with all answers to all questions. Soage 
does marginalize the theological ideas of Qutb and does not speak much on the fact that 
he does have very specific ideas on how a government shall act and govern in his new 
world order of global Islamic governance. By focusing on the Islamist elements of Qutb’s 
theology, Soage does miss the crucial aspect of Qutb’s longevity which is the specific 
realm he sees leadership acting within as the embodiments of Islam’s law. Again, we see 
a researcher missing the idea that Sunni authority construction is not about delegitimating 
or removing authority, but instead transforming and relocation authority to its perceived 
“proper place.” 
 However, no conscious transformation can be a type of transformation itself. Not 
all Sunni authority models seek to re-center proper authority but instead to re-center 
attention on what is proper authority. “The Saudi State as an Identity Racketeer” by Ben 
Rich and Ben MacQueen tries to highlight and shed light on this particular process 
through the Saudi government’s relationship with the Saudi ‘ulema. Rich and MacQueen 
push a theory that the Saudi state has mostly co-opted the religious establishment as a 
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form of authority supplementation.  They argue that the Saudi government engages in a 12
four-step program, encouraging revivalists within its citizens, offering protections against 
ontological insecurities created by the revivalist theology. Yet, the Saudi state creates the 
very circumstances that cause ideological insecurity in its practices.   13
 It then repeats the cycle of offering protections for those suffering from this 
insecurity, which continues to shore up whatever spiritual authority the state is lacking in 
any particular moment.  This could easily been seen as logical from the perspective of 14
the Saudi state, but it also does ignore the assumed philosophical buy-in from the 
religious apparatus within Saudi Arabia. The state is not co-opting religion and 
spirituality for its authoritative ends but engaging in a form of authority sharing. If Rich 
and MacQueen’s assertion is that the the state continues to expand the religious 
revivalism within Saudi Arabia to manage authority gaps, then the religious establishment 
would be invested in the outcome that results in more strict adherents for its own 
spiritual-political ends. Rich and MacQueen do not refute this, but their characterization 
does assume a lack of clerical buy-in that is not in evidence from observation. The fact 
that the Saudi state is continually able to repeat Rich and MacQueen’s four-step cycle 
would speak to the fact that the clerical authority is willing and able to lend its authority 
 Rich, et. al. "The Saudi State as an Identity Racketeer." Middle East Critique 26, no. 2 (2017): 12
108.
 ibid 10913
 Rich, et. al. "The Saudi State." 109.14
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to the state. By lending its authority to the state, the ‘ulema is able to re-center Saudi 
Sunni attention to where the theological authority ultimately comes from: the ‘ulema. 
 Yet, even researchers are often aware that Sunni practice is often too tied to the 
location of where these communities reside, rather than seeing them as different 
expressions of the same Islamic faith. Zareena Grewal’s “Destabilizing Orthodoxy, De-
territorializing the Anthropology of Islam” states that orthodoxy is a too-loaded term, 
primarily used by constructivist and nominalist analytics in order to either apologize for 
Islam or overly criticize Islam.  Analysts in the past, according to Grewal, have either 15
reduced religion to a complete irrational philosophy removed from lived practice or they 
interpret Islam as such a broad theological practice that there is no need or reason to 
define a concrete idea of Islam. Grewal’s understanding of orthodoxy can be extremely 
successful in understanding modern ideas of authority specifically because she presents 
orthodoxy as a term used to delegitimate theorizing outside of the status quo Islam.  16
However, Grewal also argues that orthodoxy is a term primarily to delegitimate Islamic 
theorizing within the United States, particularly from Black Sunni converts. While this 
may in fact be an accurate representation of the term’s use, it does center the United 
States Sunni community within a vacuum, ignoring the history and practice of American 
Muslims seeking more traditional Muslim venues for granting Islamic knowledge and 
authority. Grewal’s article attempts to reveal a particular American center of Islamic 
 Grewal, Zareena. "Destabilizing Orthodoxy, De-territorializing the Anthropology of Islam." 15
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84, no. 1 (2016): 47.
 ibid 49-5216
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theorizing, but at the price of avoiding the relationship between American Muslims and 
other Muslim localities for their theorizing. 
 Research on Sunni authority construction is robust and focuses on many aspects. 
It touches on the relationships between theorizers, communities, and state apparatus. It is 
able to swiftly and succinctly speak to the many pressures modern Sunni authority 
models face in the wake of globalization, multi-culturalism, the digital environment, and 
even the reflections of historians. However, much of this research is still too focused on 
decentralizing Sunni communities and breaking the threads that often connect them. Even 
in the modern era, Sunni communities are not seeking to exclusively center themselves as 
authorities at the expense of other authority models. Instead, a better characterization 
missed by the majority of literature is that authority models seek to re-center Islamic 
authority in relation to Sunni communities broadly. Qutb’s theology and political 
theorizing, the state relationships of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi ‘ulema, and the 
American Muslim desire to connect to the global Sunni Muslim network are all attempts 
to recenter authority models through community transformation.  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Chapter Three: Qutb and the All-Encompassing Islamic Authority 
 Sayyid Qutb is often regarded as one of the most influential thinkers on Islamic 
authority for the modern era, and the relationship between Muslims, God, and the leaders 
who unofficially served as the bridge between them. Qutb was an Egyptian theorist and 
social activist who rose to prominence in the early years of Egyptian independence. 
Qutb’s early life was marked through a desire to work within Egypt by relating his 
homeland to the greater “West” as it was constructed (The United States, Western 
Europe).  Qutb as a young boy and young man was quite critical of the religious 17
establishment throughout Egypt, and was well educated in both religious and secular 
thought for the time.  Qutb attended university in Cairo at Dar al-Ulum to learn the 18
British methods of education and teaching, focusing on literature reviews and religious 
theory in his spare time.  Already a published author by 25, Qutb continued to work 19
within education, both as a teacher and as a bureaucrat in the Egyptian Ministry of 
Education.  His understandings formed a ideological foundation, for him, that required 20
religion to be the cornerstone of thought and action in the world. Religiosity did not 
 Quṭb, Sayyid. Milestones. Edited by A. B. Al-Mehri. Birmingham, England: MAKTABAH, 17
2006. Accessed March 22, 2018. 7.
 ibid 718
 ibid 719
 ibid 820
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simply require lip service but an active attempt to bring about a more faithful and faith-
led society.  
 This ideological foundation was solidified and strengthened when confronted with 
the Western value system when he attended what is now University of Northern Colorado 
in Greeley, Colorado, from 1948-1950.  Qutb saw Western/American society as a 21
spiritually repressive place, where people were not allowed to access their spiritual health 
from the amount of discipline and self-control required in Western individualism.  This 22
lack of access of the spiritual health was simply social and government authority pushing 
their citizens away from faith and religion in favor of the cultural norms of society 
outside the religious sphere. In some ways for Qutb, this was similar to the issues of the 
Egyptian clerical structure.  They too were more concerned with enforcing a specific set 23
of practices and cultural norms rather than attempting to deepen the peoples’ connection 
to the faith and spirit, or even serving as a check against un-Islamic leadership in the 
government.  These experience would lead Qutb to shift his theological understandings 24
to a more radical emphasis on a closed system of Islamic governance where no authority 
other than that of God would be recognized in society.   25
 Quṭb. Milestones. 821
 ibid 822
 ibid 823
 Khatab, S. "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb." Middle Eastern 24
Studies 38, no. 3 (2002): 145-70.
 ibid 14925
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 Qutb’s influence on Egypt and greater Arab Muslim thinking cannot be over-
expressed. Often cited as the original Islamist for the modern age, Qutb sought out to 
explain a holistic Islamic society for Egypt, and by extension the Muslim world itself. 
Qutb’s Islamism is unique specifically because it is based on the idea that Islam is a total 
and closed system, without any need for influence or importation from other ideological 
system.  Qutbi ideology relies specifically on the Qur’an as the social and religious 26
document that creates the boundaries for all Muslims. This means that Islam does not 
need any man-made modifiers such as “Islamic democracy” or “Islamic socialism” or 
even an “Islamic authority.”  Islam was its own complete system that, to Qutb, addressed 27
all of humanity’s needs, desires, and spiritual requirements.  If such a system is indeed 28
perfect and addressed all needs, adding on imperfect human systems such as democracy, 
socialism, marxism, nationalism, or really any “-ism” would be marring the perfection of 
Islam.  Islam needed to be quarantined and be addressed on its own terms, not modified 29
or predicated with human systems to become more attractive to the masses. Islam was the 
truth of the universe regardless if people believed it or not. In fact, for Qutb, many of the 
so-called “natural laws” of understood by the secular world were in fact simply 
 Soage,. "Islamism and Modernity." 189-203.26
 ibid 19427
 Yahya Bouzarinejad, et. al. "Sayyid Qutb and Political Islam: Islamic Government from the 28
Perspective of Sayyid Qutb." Tarih Kültür Ve Sanat Araştırmaları Dergisi 5, no. 4 (2017): 
92-112.
 ibid 9829
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manifestations of the shariah, God’s law.  Attempts to section off the perfection of God’s 30
creation into discrete categories that where overlapping yet distinct were merely attempts 
to separate the wholeness of God’s creation. God’s creation was whole and perfect from 
its inception, and his law was no exception. The perfection of the Qur’an as a document 
of law, or hakimiyyah, requires no outside interpretation or influence, just obedient 
adherence.  31
 This adherence of course was not simply a physical action. Muslims must then 
also understand that their internal dialogue, their internal ideologies and reasoning behind 
their practice must also be examined and re-asserted into a proper Islamic headspace. 
While traditional view of the jahiliyah refers to the time before Islam’s revelation and 
before Muhammad’s ascension to prophethood, Qutb instead believed that the jahiliyah 
was a mindset, a powerful and tempting ideology that could easily spring up again each 
generation if not controlled and eradicated.  Just as the Islamic principle of tajdid meant 32
that Islam could be renewed each generation, formatted for the trials of the times, so 
could the jahiliyah.  The greatest of the jahiliyat was be a non-Muslim, to reject the 33
message of Islam itself. However, even if one was an acknowledged Muslim, one could 
still fall into the patterns of ignorance just as easily as one could fall into the patterns of 
 Quṭb. Milestones.30
 Khatab. "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah.”161.31
 ibid 16132
 ibid 16133
!18
renewal.  Being a Muslim would require a constant vigilance and a type of 34
crowdsourcing, requiring others to constantly police each other and consistently draw 
consensus of practice and belief from the Qur’an. Of course, this model of an Islamic 
world meant that it was not simply enough to “be” Muslim. One could give zakat, 
perform salah five times a day, fast during Ramadan, and perform hajj and yet still not be 
a true Muslim. This is because for Qutb, the first pillar, the supreme pillar of Islam, the 
Shahada, was not a simple acknowledgement of the supremacy of God’s authority but 
also required people to live as such.  This meant a rejection of any and all thoughts that 35
were non-Islamic in origin. 
 Often cited as one of the first modern Islamic thinkers, Sayyid Qutb was first and 
foremost a heavily critical thinker towards Muslims within the Arab world. While Qutb 
did not place heavy emphasis on critiquing or criticizing the practice of individual 
Muslims specifically, he often argued that Muslims around the world were being misled 
and directed away from the faith by their leaders and statesmen.  The leaders and 36
statesmen, in Qutbs eyes, spent far more time orienting themselves towards the two 
political hegemonies of the time, the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than 
attempting to reorient themselves and their people towards God.  Qutb’s philosophy on 37
Islamic authority did not allow or accept spaces between religious authority and political 
 ibid 16334
 Quṭb. Milestones.35
 ibid36
 Orbach, Danny. "Tyrannicide in Radical Islam: The Case of Sayyid Qutb and Abd Al-Salam 37
Faraj." Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 6 (2012): 961-72.
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authority. Qutb’s vision of Islam was a complete system, and therefore Islam functioned 
as a religious movement, a political theory, and as social norms all at once.  For a 38
Muslim leader, or the leader of a Muslim-majority country, to even dabble or ally with 
secular Western powers would be a refutation of Islam in principle, if not in name.  This 39
is drawn from Qutb’s idea that authority in the physical world is ultimately derived from 
God’s authority. If Muslim leaders were to ally themselves with secular powers, they 
were either opening up their societies for potential jahiliyah actions or refuting the 
authority and lessons of the Qur’an by reciprocally acknowledging the authority of non-
Muslim entities.  
 These are both possible, and for Qutb probable, because by simply engaging in 
the nation-state model of the mid-20th century was to implicitly grant states authority 
when that authority should exclusively be the purview of God.  Further, Muslim leaders 40
allowing non-Muslim leaders the social status of “fellow leader” was also a powerfully 
non-Islamic action, as authority over people came exclusively from God.  For a Muslim 41
leader to lend authority, even just in their own interpretation, to non-Muslim leaders was 
paramount to assuming the role of God. If all authority no matter its sphere comes from 
God, for any leader to expand their understanding of authoritative is to supersede God’s 
law via the shariah and the Qur’an in favor of their own flawed human interpretation. 
 ibid 96638
 ibid 96439
 Bouzarinejad, et. al. "Sayyid Qutb and Political Islam" 92-112.40
 Soage. "Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb." 189-203.41
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Qutb’s construction of Islam’s authority over the world applied to exactly that— the 
entire world. There was no method for Muslim leaders to deal critically with non-Muslim 
leaders because Qutb did not believe in a non-Muslim’s right to serve as leader, over 
Muslims or fellow non-Muslims.  Non-Muslims were the embodiment of jahiliyah for 42
Qutb, an almost-physical rejection of God’s authority and Islam’s domain.  Therefore, 43
Qutb denied any right for non-Muslims to exist outside of Islamic authority in any 
capacity.  If non-Muslims were allowed to exist, that would mean that Islam held space 44
in its domain for the existence of non-believers.  
 Yet, Qutb also heavily argued against the mere idea that a nation-state system 
would somehow be a viable and sustainable model for Muslims. At best, Qutb’s outlook 
on national leaders could be characterized as a stop-gap measure. The nation-state 
system, even in Muslim-majority countries, based on a secular Western division of 
powers and authority within a community. Egypt had functioned in such a way 
throughout its colonial history, often having the administrative leaders separated from the 
clerical, religious leaders. This separation was like attempting to divide or corral Islam 
itself, separating its authority over everything into mere zones of influence. Religious 
authority had no place in Qutb’s world if it had no ability to enforce the totality of Islam 
as needed. Islam was not meant to be selectively applied to problems, but instead applied 
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to all problems in all spheres. And at worst, the nation-state system was only another 
form of servitude and spiritual enslavement of the general populace.  45
  While Qutb’s understanding of authority as a whole came from its metaphysical 
Islamic core, Qutb also rejected the principle that any system made would somehow be 
able to properly administer the plans of Islamic universalist theology. Islam’s authority 
came because it was the law of God, not because of its definition as a “religion.” Leaders, 
no matter how valiant their efforts may be, would always rely on an authority that 
required the servitude of other men. Their authority was not ultimately based on the 
Qur’an, according to Qutb, but instead on the agreed servitude of those they led.  This 46
was not just for temporal political leaders, but for the clerical leaders across the Muslim 
world, and most specifically in Egypt. Qutb saw a major flaw of the clerical structure in 
Egypt, and by extension the Muslim world, in that the clerical establishment had been 
made responsible for the understanding and implementation of Islam. This authority did 
not come from the Qur’an or from the shariah, but from human-made systems and an 
interpretation not founded in the core ideas of Islam.   47
 The clerical establishment of Egypt, much like the secular government structure, 
was based on a temporal authority structure that required the authority to be granted from 
those following the clerics, not from God. These leaders were then also rejecting their 
true purpose in God’s plan by attempting to hold on and maintain their authority within 
 Soage. "Islamism and Modernity." 189-203.45
 Khatab. "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah." 145-70.46
 Soage,. "Islamism and Modernity:."189-203.47
!22
their societies. Their positions are not meant to be kept as true aspects of authority, but 
instead to be used as a type of vanguard for the future Islamic utopia.  While Qutb 48
wavered on the role of jihad within his idea of Islam, jihad against non-believers was no 
doubt a part of his plan in order to establish Islamic authority on all things.  By these 49
leaders, both traditionally religious and political, holding on to their authority within 
society rather than using it as a spring to eventually make their roles unneeded. Qutb’s 
vision of God’s authority truly brought to the world in its purest form did not include a 
more traditional idea of leaders and religious interpreters, because these positions 
required humanity to place their trust in the men in those positions. It also required 
humanity to follow the laws, interpretations, and services presented and controlled by 
men of these systems. These, to Qutb, were yet more versions of humanity attempting to 
remove their own duty to God and export it out to other sources. God’s authority requires 
humanity to offer service to God, not by offering service to social institutions or powerful 
people in return for religious interpretation.  
 These critiques of the Muslim leadership blended into his critiques of the ‘umma 
itself. Qutb believed that the true Muslim community had gone “extinct for a few 
centuries” and that those who called themselves Muslims were actually living in a space 
of jahiliyah, or ignorance of God’s law.  This arose from the fact that by Qutb’s time, 50
non-Muslim rulers had been leading Muslims in Egypt for multiple centuries. Qutb’s 
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affinity and complicated relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood was generated 
specifically from this shared desire to remove secular Western influence and to bring 
Islamic authority and social conventions back into their pillared status for Egyptian 
society.  While Qutb clashed with Brotherhood leaders and his influence often brought 51
about undue state attention to the organization, the Brotherhood was also committed to 
creating a more just, Islamic world within Egypt explicitly and removing secular Western 
influence.  Much of the Brotherhood’s later understanding of what a just Islamic nation 52
looks like comes from the writings of Sayyid Qutb on his vision of said society, saying in 
Milestones that:  
A Muslim community is that which is a practical interpretation of the declaration 
of faith and all its characteristics; and the society which does not translate into 
practice this faith and its characteristics is not a Muslim society. Thus the 
declaration of faith provides the foundation for a complete system of life for the 
Muslim community in all its details.  53
Qutb did not see a world where a Muslim could believe in God without specifically 
following the interpretation and orders given to the Muslim world by the Qur’an. The 
complicated part for Qutb is that most Egyptian Muslims, and Sunnis at large, believed 
themselves to be proper-acting, proper-believing Muslims even while living in a secular 
society or having a secular government. This contradiction is at the heart of Qutb’s 
struggle in society, and for Qutb, the answer means a clean slate for all Muslims. 
Milestone’s thesis is predicated on a desire and duty for Muslims to renounce anything 
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that is not of Islam, anything of the jahiliyah, and to return to their roots and rediscover 
their practice through the Qur’an, the hakimiyyah.   54
 Of course, this is coded as Qutb’s beliefs and interpretations of the document, not 
the interpretations of others and certainly not the interpretations of the religious 
establishments.  Qutb believed the establishment had been corrupted by capitulations to 55
the Western empires and that a true Muslim leadership must arise to lead Muslims back to 
the “true” Islam of the fundament. However, Qutb’s version of leadership does not mean 
a leadership in the contemporary sense of a nation-state leader, figurehead, or elite class. 
Qutb operated under the ideology that Islam and shariah were designed to allow “all men 
to become free from the servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the 
worship of Allah alone, deriving guidance from Him alone, and bowing before Him 
alone.”  For example, both capitalism and communism fail people in the West in that 56
they require the servitude of other men.  Leaders are not always without flaw or bias, 57
and can easily encourage the jahiliyah upon their people, corrupting by example. These 
people are then also following a path that is un-Islamic, often times blocked off from 
Islam due to their corrupted obligations to leaders or other men, and not God and only 
God. Exclusively through the Islamic way, ideally and theoretically, would allow a type 
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of morally righteous anarchic community to arise and maintain God’s authority on earth, 
no leaders required. 
 Qutb was executed by the Egyptian government under General Nasr in 1966, yet 
his philosophy continues to live in as an influential aspect of Islamism as a theological-
political philosophy. One of Qutb’s strongest philosophical points in his authority 
construction is that all authority is ultimately derived from God. This construction is 
often seen as Qutb reflecting a anti-hierarchical and anti-authority mindset, but is not 
what Qutb saw his ideology as performing. Qutb’s understanding of Islamic authority 
was that all human-created institutions would ultimately fail or be corrupted by 
ignorance, and therefore could not be held in any particular esteem. This is in tandem 
with Qutb’s anti-statist bent to his authority construction. Islam was not revealed to be 
split and divided between various peoples and nations, but to address the crisis of faith 
that humanity found itself in.  Therefore, God’s authority must be encompassed to all of 58
humanity, and nation-states were simply a method to divide the now-global Muslim 
community. The divisions then allowed for people to invest their ideas of authority within 
specific leaders or institutions, rather than in God where it should be. Also, this idea of 
authority as exclusively being the purview of God removes the theoretical need of 
societal leaders at all. Instead the community itself was to be a self-policing, utopian 
anarchy where a true consensus could be achieved.  
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 This idea of a community without human leaders is a complicated idea to 
extrapolate to the greater Islamic world, but Qutb’s influence continues to be brought up 
as a reason for Islamism to exist within the nation-state political sphere as well as also 
being the argument against national figureheads at all. One of the interesting aspects of 
Qutb’s philosophy for authority construction and its conclusion for an Islamic universalist 
utopia is that there are no practical, immediate plans or solutions for how to properly 
implement this system. This philosophical ambivalence then creates space for successive 
theorizers to read their desires into the Qutbi ideal.  The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
arguably a practical wing of Qutbi ideology and his attempt for a Islamist political 
system, had no qualms about posting a candidate for the Egyptian elections after the fall 
of President Mubarak.   59
 While some of Qutb’s writings would push against the idea that entering a non-
Islamic political election due to the fact that it was embracing an fundamentally non-
Islamic system of governance, other aspects would encourage the exact opposite.  60
Qutb’s philosophy also was predicated on bringing Islam back into every aspect of 
human society. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood could also see an argument that they 
should be attempting to run a true Muslim candidate. A Muslim in the vein of Qutb could 
bring about a greater Islamic influence on society, spurring future movements towards the 
Islamic ideal that would eliminate the need for an Egyptian president all together.  
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 The other major pillar of Qutb’s theory of authority also comes from the premise 
that the community itself needs to be involved in the process from beginning to end. For 
Muslim populations, the idea of a clerical establishment dedicated to Islamic 
interpretation and Islamic jurisprudence defeats the idea of Islamic equality. Qutb saw 
Islam as the only philosophical system that would be able to truly free people from 
servitude to other people, whether benevolent or malicious.  Therefore, if a Muslim 61
population created a system where the community no longer needed to come to 
consensus on understanding and interpreting the shariah, but instead allowed others to do 
it for them, they would instead be serving yet another human construct of authority, not 
the divine authority. The divine authority of God was the true authority, and Muslims 
needed to engage each other and be willing to communicate in order to create the 
universalist Islamic world Qutb envisioned for the world.  
 This authority model is explicitly based on rejecting the need for clerical 
apparatus and more traditional models of religious authority, yet also the abstract theories 
of Qutb again leave room for interpretation. It is obviously heavily implied that Qutb’s 
understanding and interpretation of Islam was the only method that should be seen as the 
“true” Islam. However, Qutb’s writings also argued that the Muslim community could not 
rely on outsourcing interpretations of the shariah and that the community was to 
collectively agree and submit to the authority of God, embracing the true idea of the 
Sunni Islam foundation.  This obfuscated approach to communicating his theories to the 62
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Muslim world is possibly even a method to have more of the Muslim world to engage 
with his work. Because the work has implementation gaps and Qutb seems to contradict 
himself in some ways throughout his writings, one could easily argue that Qutb’s 
vagueness is a rhetorical choice. While Qutb clearly believes that he has discovered the 
path towards universal Islamic implementation for humanity, Qutb seems to also want 
people to critically engage with his work rather than simply read it and treat it as canon. 
In many ways, this is the authority model Qutb proposes, a model where Muslims must 
always be willing to re-analyze and re-critique and re-invest in Islam and the Qur’an and 
the ultimate authority of God. God’s authority is always being reified on Earth and it is 
the Muslim community’s duty and obligation to continually remind themselves and 
others that God’s authority is the only authority that matters, not the authority of secular 
political leaders or traditional religious leaders, because both are merely parts of a 
political-religious-cultural Islamic system. 
 However, with all the influence of Sayyid Qutb on modern Sunni authority 
construction, Qutb’s model is not the only method that has arisen in the later 20th 
century. Qutb’s philosophy was, and is, quite radical in its call for the elimination of 
separated Muslim identities and nation-states. Weaving this call into Qutb’s general 
philosophy that Islam was a closed system that was religious and political with no space 
between the two, it was not entirely taken well by all Sunni Muslim communities. For 
other Sunni communities, Islam was not a separate universal system, but instead a 
religious system that must work in tandem with the state apparatus, not supersede and 
overturn the state apparatus.  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Chapter Four: The State as Authority Confirmation in Saudi Arabia 
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has existed in various forms since the mid-18th 
century, named after the founding member of the dynastic monarchy Muhammad bin 
Saud. What makes the Saudi kingdom distinct from various other governments within the 
modern Sunni Muslim world is that the Saud dynasty rose to power explicitly on an 
authority-sharing agreement with religious leaders. The original King Saud partnered 
together with the cleric Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a radical and strict interpreter of 
the Qur’an, primarily concerned with Muslims not properly showing allegiance to God 
alone and instead engaging in shirk, or apostasy.  The House of Saud was to run the 63
political agenda of the fledging kingdom while the adherents of al-Wahhab’s theology 
would maintain influence over how Islam was practiced within the kingdom. Over a 
century later, This authority allegiance has continued to manifest itself powerfully within 
Saudi Arabia, yet with a far more uneven split that originally anticipated.  
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the most opaque in the world, and its 
clerical apparatus even more opaque than most institutions, but by observations it appears 
that throughout the modern age the state has subsumed some parts of religious authority 
traditionally held for the clerical establishment.  This religious interpretation has 64
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continued to connect the Saudi royal family to the clerical establishment within the 
kingdom and has created one of the most puritan, traditionalist schools within the Muslim 
world. In Saudi Arabia, Sunni Muslims are required to adhere to a strict understanding of 
the Qur’an and hadith.  In recent decades, the Saudi religious establishment has also 65
partnered with the state to further expand its interpretation into other Islamic nations, 
mostly non-Arab Muslim nations that are former Soviet republics.  The Saudi religious 66
community has spent hundreds of millions of dollars since the late 1990s in order to 
establish religious education centers and islamic seminaries with the aim of training 
students in the Wahhabi-Salafi interpretation of Islam.  These schools were quite 67
common in Albania for over a decade and continue to grow and become more influential 
for Muslim communities in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in the 21st century.   68
 Saudi Arabia is also notorious for funding radical Islamic groups across the 
greater Middle East, with Saudi funds being used to supplement resources for 
organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and even militia groups in the 
2013 Syrian civil war.  The one caveat attached to these funding structures is that not all 69
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are done under the banner of the Saudi official government, but sometimes by influential 
Saudi royal family members and business leaders. However, the political environment 
within the kingdom is such that any large money transfer or donation is most likely 
approved, however tacitly, by the Saudi government.  This relatively radical 70
interpretation of Islamic thought within Saudi continues to grow and change, despite its 
historical adherence to the tenets and teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and 
by extension, the interpretations of the contemporary clerics within Saudi Arabia. One of 
the most prominent clerics is Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, former grand mufti and legal 
scholar who influenced much of Saudi legal interpretation throughout the mid-20th 
century. 
 Wahhabi-Salafism is a strain of Islamic ideology very much concerned with the 
ideas of authority and proper obedience towards those in the faith. However, Wahhabi-
Salafism is explicitly and irrevocably tied into the idea of a Muslim state, with a Muslim 
leader at the apex of society who is meant to lead the faithful in society. This particular 
view of Islam also pushes back against the idea that a Muslim rule must somehow be the 
philosopher-king, able to perfectly embody shariah as if it were natural behavior. Instead, 
Wahhabi-Salafism relies on a particular model of authority, where the leader is to be the 
representative for the entire community and exist as a physical manifestation of God’s 
authority on earth. Because Wahhabi-Salafism is predominantly concerned with issues of 
heresy and apostasy, it is less important on whether or not its adherents are believing 
  Farquhar. "SAUDI PETRODOLLARS”. 701-21.70
!32
something than whether or not they practice it in public or private.  Heresy is a issue of 71
praxis, where certain behaviors or traditions may be seen as un-Islamic or as an affront to 
God. For Wahhabi-Salafism, this can be things such as venerating a tomb, holding onto 
local traditions or rituals that are not mentioned in the Qur’an or the hadith, or even 
improperly honoring Muhammad (usually by being too invested in his tomb or birth 
place).  Praying to saints openly would also be a form of heresy, or shirk, specifically 72
because it would implicitly reject the idea that Islam is a monotheistic religion, for all 
prayers in monotheisms should be sent towards God, and only God.  73
 Wahhabi-Salafism is also inherently an insecure ideology within the Islamic 
sphere. This is not to state that it should be seen as “weak” or ineffective, but instead that 
the ideology requires insecurity in one’s status in the faith in order to be effective.  In 74
order for Wahhabi-Salafism to continue to be prominent and influential on religious 
practice, it must continually push the idea that shirk is mere footsteps away, waiting for a 
practitioner to wander into its clutches. Wahhabi-Salafism does not attempt to define the 
inherent characteristics of Muslims (read: Sunni Muslims) like Qutb’s jahiliyah/tajdid 
paradigm of belief, but instead as a piety/heresy paradigm of behavior.  Wahhabi-75
Salafism does not generally claim that a Muslim can somehow fall out of being Muslim, 
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but instead that they are a Muslim betraying their duties to the ruler, the state, and to God. 
This is also why the ruler as a physical representative of God’s authority is so important. 
The ruler is not put on Earth in order to interpret or embody shariah, but instead to 
enforce the shariah as it is understood by the clerical structure and set an example for all 
adherents to model and follow after. The Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine specifically needs the 
authority of God invested in the state so the state can mitigate, control, and enforce 
normative standards of behavior that will allow the ideology to continue, and in theory 
prevent the community from collectively falling into shirk. However, since for Saudi 
Arabia the authority model is not entirely invested within the state, there is overlap and 
occasional friction between the authority of the ruler as the state and the authority of the 
cleric as religiosity.  
 From this friction comes Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz as one of the most 
influential Wahhabi-Salafi clerics within modern Saudi Arabia. Bin Baz served as head of 
the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and Head of the Council of Senior Scholars from 1992 
until his death in 1999, President of the Muslim World League, and judge of the al-Kharj 
district from 1938 to 1952.  Sheikh bin Baz was a controversial figure within Saudi 76
religious politics specifically because of his religious decrees in relation to the state. 
Sheikh bin Baz operated within the traditional Saudi education system for Islamic 
jurisprudence, allowing his religious authority to enhance and support state authority. Bin 
Baz issued thousands of fatwas over the course of his life, yet one of his most historic and 
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influential is the fatwa authorizing a wealth tax to fund mujahideen fighters in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, implicitly confirming the Saudi state as an enemy 
of the Soviet state.  This is noted as the first case of a fatwa being used to encourage 77
inter-state violence in the international system. Bin Baz also frequently issued fatwas to 
support the Saudi state internally, routinely and categorically condemning the right for 
violent uprising by citizens towards their leaders.  Bin Baz’s fatwa on the matter argued 78
that the only reason citizens may overthrow or act out against their government leaders 
was if the leader issued an order that was against God.  Bin Baz is also seen by many 79
scholars as one of the original motivators for the Saudi Dawah system, in which the state 
has invested in foreign Muslim nations to establish Wahhabi-style religious school and 
Islamic centers in order to help create a more “pure” Muslim community outside of the 
Arabian Peninsula.  This was considered to have been done in conjunction with the 80
Saudi state apparatus and fatwas were issued by bin Baz in order to help support the 
Saudi government effort to expand religious authority over Muslims that were not Saudi 
themselves. 
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 Sheikh bin Baz is a complicated and often unreliable figure within Saudi history 
specifically because of the opaque nature of the Saudi regime and its internal politics. 
However, based on the behavior and fatwas of Sheikh bin Baz, at best guess the religious 
leader had a firm grasp of the Saudi political system and saw his duty within the clerical 
apparatus as one to help support and sanctify the state for Muslim eyes. Sheikh bin Baz 
repeatedly and consistently issued fatwas that gave religious justification for Saudi 
government policy, both in dealing with neighboring countries and in regards to its own 
citizens. The sheikh offered justification for Saudi political machinations against the 
Soviet Union, encouraged the Saudi government structure to continue “spreading” 
Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine outside of the Hijaz, and repeatedly issued condemnations of 
disobedience towards the Saudi state.  This is not just a matter of offering justification 81
for Saudi policy, but also to enhance and grant multiple layers of authority to the policies 
of the Saudi state throughout his career.  
 Presumably Sheikh bin Baz had the ability to simply remain quiet and neutral 
towards state policy if he did not feel it appropriate or within his understanding of Islam. 
Instead he actively sought out opportunities to lend his religious authority to the state’s 
authority on policy decisions. In fact, most likely this could be seen as the sheikh’s small 
attempt to help influence the Saudi policy apparatus towards maintaining paths he saw 
worth following for the future of Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine. This 
could be due to the fact that Sheikh bin Baz was very much a cleric in the upper echelons 
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of Saudi society and Saudi government. He served as judge, grand mufti, and global 
Muslim leader and Islamic influencer. 
  Sheikh bin Baz was very much a person whose career was predicated on and 
maintained by its relationship to the state of Saudi Arabia. Just as he often granted his 
religious authority credentials to Saudi policy, his relationship to the Saudi state in turn 
strengthened his own authority presumably because the state used its authority to 
continually promote him.  This authority sharing model incorporates the clerical 82
structure and makes it an unofficial arm of the government system, and can then draw 
other religious adherents into its influence. After all, if the state is the faith and the faith is 
through the state, any other adherents to the Wahhabi-Salafi state will begin to feel 
limited loyalty and affinity for the Saudi regime. They will become reluctant or unaware 
allies specifically because the influential leaders of the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine receive 
and share their authority with the state, creating a dualist theocracy of sorts. The authority 
simply cannot be removed or understood without the context of the state embedded 
within it. 
 Because the state and the faith cannot be separated or understood without their 
influence on each other, it also makes Saudi Arabia a rather unique Sunni Muslim state 
within the global order. Saudi Arabia often co-opts the rhetoric of Wahhabi-Salafism in 
order to further its own political agendas, even when religion is not always at the 
forefront.  It frequently holds its status as the state which contains Mecca, and thus is the 83
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administrator of the yearly hajj to Mecca, as a powerful item for holding Islamic 
authority in the greater world. The Hajj is a complicated network of political affiliations 
in the modern age specifically because the religious act cannot be separated from the 
Saudi state. The Saudi state adminsters the Hajj, prepares for the Hajj, is required to 
screen all potential arrivals for the Hajj. The Saudi state is then also able to exert control 
over the Hajj process and maintain its own personal standards of who and what is 
considered Muslim and therefore allowed entry into Saudi Arabia and more specifically 
Mecca. Hajj cannot be removed from the state. Similarly, the network of madrasas and 
even larger dawah system endorsed by Sheikh bin Baz cannot be removed from the state. 
The Saudi state contributes a fair amount of money to the dawah fund and is responsible 
for the negotiations that allow the indigenous locations to receive Saudi money.  The 84
Saudi elite also apparently donate to the system as well, understanding their duty as 
Muslims within Saudi Arabia to the help the state spread Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine as the 
“true” Islam and their authority must be heard and respected.  
 This constant practice by Saudi Arabia as it frequently seeks to expand its control 
and use religion as a form of soft power can also be seen within the lens of the authority 
merger between the clerical structure and the government structure. As stated before, the 
Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine is an inherently insecure doctrine. It is not just based on the idea 
of repelling heresy within Muslim communities, but based in using the state as the 
primary motivator and apparatus to root out and prevent heresy.  Therefore, an insecure 85
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doctrine that is limited to only one region or one nation-state is not ideal for its 
ideological security. This is where instead the doctrine begins to hijack the state 
apparatus’s authority in attempts to diffuse itself further. The dawah system can be seen 
as the inverse of the Hajj model. While the Saudi state uses religious authority in order to 
establish political authority over Mecca and the Hajj, the religious establishment uses the 
state’s political authority in order to help spread itself to other Muslim nations where it 
might be able to take root and thrive.  
 The Saudi government’s choices in Albania, Pakistan, and parts of Central Asia 
are easily understood when seen through the lens of ideology diffusion. These specific 
nations have complicated and often tense relationships with Islam due to their personal 
history. Albania, Pakistan, and the Central Asian nations were all colonized in some form 
and many of them were forbid religion as public praxis.  Therefore, Wahhabi-Salafism 86
would not have to fight against a regularly practiced indigenous form of Islam. It would 
instead be able to easily take root and convince many Muslims that their religious 
practices had instead been corrupted by the influence of the secular colonizers. These 
Muslims would then be “shown” that their was a pure Islamic path for them, a path 
towards Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine in particular. 
 By spreading this doctrine further and into multiple localities, the Wahhabi-Salafi 
doctrine also is then able to create circumstances where various versions of a state-
religious alliance are possible. Saudi Arabia, as the first, remains the concept for the 
 Ayoob, et. al. Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia.86
!39
religious franchise but the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine is ideologically comfortable with 
some variety. This means that not all localities where Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine can thrive 
attempt to create a clone of the Saudi model; but instead to create political incentive 
within these nations to operate similarly to Saudi Arabia. Operating similarly to the Saudi 
model then allows religion to co-opt and share authority with the state apparatus in each 
nation. Of course, many of these religious leaders are not stationed within local 
communities, but instead looked to from Saudi Arabia and their widespread clerical 
establishment.  This then feeds back towards political authority as cultural movements, 87
and grants Saudi Arabia a small degree of security in the face of regional disputes. The 
Wahhabi-Salafi movement is also partially influenced by the needs of the Saudi state’s 
foreign policy, namely Iran. As Shiite denominations of Islam operate in a much more 
hierarchical slant than Sunni denominations, the political conflict between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran can also be seen to influence the methods and goals of Wahhabi-Salafi missions. 
The needs of the political authority create pressure for the religious apparatus to provide 
political support, hoping to give Saudi Arabia the ability to create a zone of influence 
similar to the Iran model in the Muslim world.  
 Yet, despite all of these attempts to co-opt and share authority between the 
political and religious sectors, the question still remains on whether or not the attempts to 
share authority are ultimately fruitful. The state authority model for Saudi Arabia is 
powerful, but very much tied into a specific authority granted by the religious 
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establishment. If for any reason a large segment of the Saudi population begin to reject 
the authority of the Wahhabi-Salafi clerical apparatus, it would be hard-pressed to 
maintain its own credit line of authority as the two establishments frequently use the 
other to support their authority. This also moves back to a central issue of what is seen to 
be “true” Islam. While the state itself may be largely protected from the persecutions and 
endgoals of the Wahhabi-Salafi movement, its population is not. For those who practice 
more idiosyncratic or less endorsed forms of Islam within Saudi Arabia, the clerical 
establishment can easily co-opt the rhetoric and authority of the state to enforce a specific 
version of Islamic interpretation. This co-opt then also can tie the hands of the Saudi state 
which may be ambivalent or supportive of certain practices not supported by the clerical 
establishment, again specifically because the state and clerics share an overlapping idea 
of authority within Saudi society.  
 Authority sharing also binds the hands of the clerical establishment on certain 
matters. By no means is the power sharing system an officially protected government 
system, and the Saudi government clearly maintains the upper-hand in any disagreement 
between the state and the clerical establishment. The overlapping authority does not 
prevent the state from being able to exercise its right to censor certain speakers, to arrest 
on suspicion of treason against the state, or even just use the powers of the state to 
theoretically intimidate the religious sphere into supporting their demands. While there is 
no evidence that the Saudi religious sphere is somehow completely under the thumb of 
the Saudi state, Saudi Arabian law grants nearly no rights to any citizen and the 
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government maintains widespread authoritarian control over Saudi society.  The Saudi 88
religious system does not share any true political influence or control beyond that which 
is given by the state itself. Therefore while the Wahhabi-Salafi clerics in Saudi Arabia 
may have influence over the population and lower-level religious leaders, the clerics do 
not possess any enshrined political power and are kept safe from state influence only 
through societal norms and unofficial deal-making between religious leaders and political 
leaders.  For the authority that is based in statist ideology and statist language, the 89
religious apparatus will always be subservient to the political apparatus, in practice if not 
in name.  
 Weaving between this power-sharing arrangement, as it does in much of Saudi 
society, is the question of wealth and representation within Saudi politics and greater 
society. Saudi Arabia has been gifted with a large deposit of crude oil and the autocratic 
slant of the government has allowed for a great expansion of wealth to the elite class in 
the kingdom. Compared to other governments’ relationships between oil and their 
citizens, the oil wealth in Saudi Arabia is largely kept within the royal family and is not 
universally shared with all Saudi citizens. The official argument by the Saudi government 
is that the oil is the national property of the government itself, and it is responsible for 
using the wealth for the good of the nation, implicitly separating “the nation” from “the 
people.” This is in some part due to the unique situations of the rentier economy within 
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Saudi Arabia (and the greater Gulf region), which does not require taxes from their 
population and is then used as a reason on why the Saudi government is not in a 
foundational position to maintain a representational relationship with its broader 
citizenry.  
 Yet, as the oil period in Saudi Arabia begins to wane and the global oil use drops, 
an economic crisis within Saudi Arabia could easily emerge. One of the major rhetorical 
defenses of the autocratic state in the kingdom is that the economic wealth and prosperity 
of the state in general is a gift from God and justification for the strong grasp the Sa’ud 
family has on national power. If the nation is no longer prosperous in economic and 
natural resources, the Sa’ud family loses a major and influential argument on why they 
deserve to maintain singlehanded control. As the potential economic crisis looms larger 
and encroaches on Saudi politics, there are a few options available to the Saudi royal 
family. They can open up the social economy to more people and reluctantly allow citizen 
representation in a greater precedent in modern history for the state. They can reach 
towards the clerical structure and lean harder upon the religious establishment to further 
shore up their argument for legitimacy. Or they can reject both approaches and simply 
renounce the lable of royalty and become simply a large, powerful, wealthy family within 
Saudi society. Now obviously, the third option is extremely unlikely in current Saudi 
society and most likely the Saudi government will attempt to straddle the line between 
religious authority and social liberalization. Some evidence is shown by the crown prince 
(as of 2018) Muhammad bin Salman pushing for more women participation in society 
(e.g. lifting the ban on women drivers) as well as committing a purge in elite classes of 
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individuals seen as suspect of the government and the ruling faction of the Saudi family. 
However, whether or not the government can continue this balancing act is very much up 
for debate and suspicion.  
 This model of authority construction could also create a model for other nations 
looking to implement and incorporate the Islamic ideal into the state apparatus rather than 
reject it. While the nation-state system is largely the norm in the modern global system, 
there are usually factions and sectors of any population that disagree or push against the 
state apparatus. Whether these opposition factions are pushing against the abstract ideas 
of the nation-state or the minutiae of governing, the incorporation of the religious 
authority apparatus reveals a new vein of authority to tap, even if the Saudi model is not 
without its own flaws. Authority often seeks to maintain authority and offering new 
models with different resources to maintain the status quo of authority within Sunni-
majority nations will continue to appeal for many Sunni states around the world. 
 One of the complexities of the Wahhabi-Salafi authority construction and its near-
permanent connection to the Saudi state apparatus is that the religious authority espoused 
and supplemented relies on a near-homogenous idea of a population and how they 
interact with the authoritative institutions. Saudi Arabia, in order to properly work in 
theory as a hybrid of state and religious authority, needs its populace to agree on 
ethnicity, nationality, and religious identity as specific Saudi Arabian Sunni Muslim 
Arabs. However, many other Muslim-majority and even Muslim-minority nations do not 
create communities under the idea of homogeneity and therefore must create new 
versions of how to understand their faith and the authorities within the community.  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Chapter Five: Comfortable Disagreement in American Sunni Communities 
 For Sunni Muslims that live in Muslim-minority nations, their understanding of 
authority can often be interpreted as complex and less invested in traditional and cultural 
religious institutions. While the foundational cornerstones of Islam, the Qur’an and the 
hadith, are still primary foci in these community practices, cultural institutions and norms 
are much less front and center. In nations such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, authority is 
very much based institutional Qur’anic interpretation and the ability to explain Islamic 
ideals in relation to a ephemeral “pure Islam.”  The regional theorists such as Qutb and 90
bin Baz are basing their interpretations on an idea that their entire society should be based 
on the core of Islamic rule. In what manner that is manifested as and how it is 
implemented are the subject of heavy debate, but the ideal is to create a society entirely 
ruled by the shariah and the Qur’an.  
 For Muslims that do not live in Muslim-majority, or even Muslim-plurality, 
nations, a different question arises. In the United States, American Muslims constitute 
approximately 1% of the population, or about 3.3 million adherents.  They are by far the 91
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most ethnically diverse religious group in the United States and come from a variety of 
traditions, cultures, and understandings of authority.  For these Muslims living within 92
the American culture, a non-religious, multi-cultural society where freedom of religion is 
enshrined within a constitution, the question is less about how to create a purely Islamic 
society. Instead, this population’s intent is more about how to forge a unity of identity and 
to create space for a diverse set of practices that can still be seen under the umbrella of 
Islam itself. 
 American Muslims are a far more diverse religious community than other 
communities within the United States for a variety of reasons. One major reason is that a 
significant segment of American Muslims are self-identified converts.  This means that 93
rather than technically inheriting their religious practices from their family or local 
communities, these Muslims often find Islam as adults and convert on a strictly 
individual understanding of the faith and its effect on their lives. A large majority of these 
converts are African-American, and in fact the overwhelming majority of American 
Muslims were native-born Black Americans up until the 1990s.  The shift in American 94
Muslim demographics comes primarily through immigration from Arab and Southeast 
Asian nations, bringing a wide set of Sunni Muslim immigrants spanning from Morocco 
to Saudi Arabia to Bangladesh and India to Senegal and Malawi. These Muslim 
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immigrants have their own culturally-centered interpretations and practices within the 
Islamic sphere that cannot be simply reduced down to a single “Islam.”  
 This heterogeneous religious population is now usually put into interactions that 
are less common within Muslim-majority nations. Because of the relatively low number 
of American Muslims in relation to the overall U.S. population, mosques must be able to 
communicate and interact with a diverse community of American, Middle Eastern, South 
Asian, and African traditions; all of which are coined as Islam. This community exposure 
also leads to a diversity of thoughts and opinions within the American Muslim 
community, specifically because the only thread that connects these disparate populations 
is their identity as Muslim. 
 This population also, in many ways, cannot rely on the semi-traditional ideas of 
religious authority from Muslim-majority nations. Whereas many Muslim-majority 
nations attempt to validate or even enact aspects of shariah into their legal systems, the 
United States has a relatively secular legal system that does not allow for a concurrent 
religious court with legal authority. While American Muslims are completely allowed to 
live their individual lives according to the precepts of shariah, there is no socio-legal 
apparatus to define what exactly shariah is to the American Muslim. For a heterogeneous 
religious population, attempting to define shariah would also be in many ways a fool’s 
errand, requiring a hypothetical national fiqh council willing to isolate a portion of their 
constituents at any given moment. Further, American Muslims in many ways are 
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formatted within the United States like a ethnic or cultural group.  This can be seen as a 95
rational logic for a nominally secular nation like the United States, attempting to flatten 
out discrepancies and disagreements within the local Muslim community in order to 
address community concerns in an efficient fashion.  
 Yet, this also feeds back into the American Muslim community, creating an 
environment where authority is derived more from an ethnographic understanding of the 
Muslim identity than a religious one. Authorities within the community then come less 
from the specific religious leaders or Islamic theorists, but instead from leaders that are 
able to stand up and lead the community as an ethnic/racial block, similar to American 
Asian community, Black American communities, American Latinx communities, or the 
American LGBTQ community.  Their authority can be derived not exclusively from 96
their standing as a leader of Islamic interpretation, but instead based on their ability to 
advocate for the community itself through the use of particular Qur’anic verses in 
addition to their community standing in general. 
 However this can cause rifts and complexity within the community. While some 
sections of the community are willing to embrace the idea of Muslim as a more cultural/
ethnic identity (the rise of “secular” Muslims, Muslim as a cultural label), other 
community sections still maintain an idea of Islam as a uniquely religious phenomenon 
that links communities together, not as a religious culture than has embedded itself in 
multiple localities. This creates circumstances where a certain individual may be lauded 
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as the leader of the “Muslim community” and seen as a spokesman to the greater 
American population, while the community itself may instead attempt to receive 
understanding from more traditional community leaders such as imams and religious 
scholars.  To add more contradiction to this phenomenon, many community leaders exist 97
in a fluid space between the two. While very few community leaders are traditionally 
trained Islamic scholars, they still often are able to cite Qur’anic passages, hadith, and 
fiqh in order to explain their arguments or understandings within the American culture.  98
Their authoritative status is not primarily based in their understanding of traditional 
Islamic theology and jurisprudence, but they frequently reinforce their authority by 
employing specific knowledge of aspects of Islamic theology. Yet, the diversity of 
thought within the American Muslim community also means that no one source of 
authority can be seen as foundational. 
 While many American Muslim communities seek leadership from within their 
communities regardless of their specific grounding in Islamic theology training, there still 
is desire to tie authority into the traditional Islamic sphere.  A significant portion of 99
young Muslims seek out ways to understand Islam and their faith from more traditional 
faith centers located in the Arab Middle East.  In some ways, these American Muslims 100
are following a long tradition of Americans relocating and spending time in traditionally 
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Islamic lands, rather for short or long periods of time, in order to reclaim an aspect of 
authority lost to many indigenous American Muslims (predominantly converts compared 
to second-generation immigrants or later).  Malcolm X was a notable Black Muslim in 101
the 1960s who spent time in pilgrimage throughout the Middle East, attempting to learn 
Arabic and gain better insight into Islamic culture to bolster his Muslim credentials in the 
United States.  He also became a focus for specifically Black American Muslims to 102
seek out similar training in nations such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, although his mantle 
of authority for Black Sunni Islam was largely forgotten after his death in the late 
1960s.   103
 This tradition of American Sunni Muslims to travel to areas such as Jordan, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia continued specifically because of the desire to recover and 
transmit Islamic traditions from the “pure” Islamic lands to the United States.  The 104
majority of these travelers specifically seek to achieve knowledge and authority from 
institutions within the Middle East specifically to then return to the United States with a 
thread of authority in order to cover up blemishes and supplement lax authority ideals 
from their own communications and charisma.  This is not necessarily a poor method in 105
order to claim authority within American Muslim community, but it does create a 
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circumstance where the Middle East continues to be the center for Islam and sets up the 
United States as an innately never-Islamic location, despite the fact that Islam is often 
coined as a universal religion.  
 This desire to seek knowledge abroad is not just for the people who seek to learn 
and transmit this new knowledge within their communities, but also for the people who 
are seeking their knowledge and assistance within the United States. Many young 
Muslims within the United States see themselves as part of an Islamic revival, seeking to 
become more pious than previous American Muslim generations in the wake of the 
Islamophobia after the September 11 attacks.  This idea of authority comes from a 106
specific desire to become a beacon of Islam within the nominally secular United States, 
and often create ideas of authority as purity from within the community. These young 
Muslims, often male and descended from Arab Muslim immigrants, tend to split 
themselves off from the seemingly-corrupting influences of the United States and greater 
American culture.  This separation and effort to interact only intra-communally is an 107
attempt to showcase their authority by their adherence to theological study, 
communication with fellow-minded isolationist Muslims, and even virtue-signaling by 
outwardly performing Islamic practices more forcefully than other Muslims in the Untied 
States.   108
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 This spark of growing piety can usually be cited, anecdotally, from experiences 
these young men have had with the United States government and national culture in 
relation to their ethnic identity and faith. One young man cites his father’s deportation 
back to Jordan as a reason to turn more intensely towards Islam and the faith.  Another 109
sees his intention to live more piously as a growth from the increased hate crimes towards 
Arab Americans and American Muslims throughout his lifetime.  Of course, these 110
Muslim American seek a very specific identity for their authority, using their group 
motivations as a method to secure their own standing within the community and their 
virtue-signaling as an attempt to demand respect from those who may not originally 
respect their authority. Further, these Muslim men see their process and practice as a way 
to serve as the vanguard of the Muslim community, to outwardly establish a powerful 
presence for the community and for non-Muslims alike. Living within the secular and 
growingly-Islamophobic United States has pushed these young men to desire a protection 
for their community.  They see their faith as a method to gain authority and respect 111
within the community and want to use that respect and authority in order to serve as 
unofficial leaders and protectors of the community itself, knowing that the authority will 
want the community to protect them in turn.  112
 ibid109
 Herrera, et. al. Being Young and Muslim.110
 ibid111
 ibid112
!52
 Despite all of these various ideas of authority, the growing American Muslim 
population is also a unique model specifically because of the generational shifts 
happening within the population itself. The American Muslim population is significantly 
younger than other religious populations in the United States.  Almost two-thirds of 113
self-identified Muslims in the United States are below the age of 40, placing this subset 
of the population in the millennial generation and the iGen generation.  Similar to their 114
non-Muslim generational counterparts, young American Muslims are increasingly 
suspect of traditional authority systems and state systems.  They are distrustful of 115
organized religious practices, governments, and seemingly foundational aspects of 
America such as capitalism.  They report more positive than average feelings towards 116
racial equality and racial justice, addressing cultural sexism, and socialist ideas such as 
state-funded healthcare and education.  They are more and more likely to be educated 117
with a college degree, and yet are still more likely to report as regularly religious or more 
pious than their non-Muslim counterparts.   118
 All of these facts and growing trends make it seem much more understandable 
about how young American Muslims derive authority in ways different than their 
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predecessors. Young American Muslims are increasingly distrustful of traditional 
authority apparatuses and instead seek more culturally communal consensus. Their 
understanding of authority comes from a place grounded in the Qur’an (like all Muslims) 
but instead of expecting individuals to explain interpretation to them, they are 
increasingly reliant on their own knowledge and community to help them work through 
Qur’anic interpretation together. Young American Muslims are less likely to attend 
mosque regularly, but still report regularly discussing their faith with each other.  These 119
young people are also willing to look outside of their communities for other models of 
authority and interpretation. Many young American Muslims are traveling outside of the 
United States to their heritage countries in addition to Qur’anic centers across the Middle 
East in order to better understand their faith. Young American Muslims clearly do not 
have a fixed idea of authority, but instead are continually shifting their perspectives, 
looking for whatever methods and processes that will allow them to reconcile their faith 
and their specific social and moral beliefs.  
 This desire by American Muslims to seek out Muslims from various communities, 
both from their home nations in addition to nations abroad, is not just physical but also 
digital. American Muslims are often quite spread out throughout the United States, with 
major loci in some major American cities. However, this then requires that American 
Muslim communities reach out through digital mediums in order to stay in contact with 
fellow adherents across the nation. Community advocacy organizations such as the 
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Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) or the United States Council of Muslim 
Organizations (USCMO) maintain robust digital operations in order to connect Muslims 
across the United States, and frequently use social media to highlight various American 
Muslim communities as an attempt to forge identity solidarity, forgoing religious 
interpretation in favor of ethnic identity formation as Muslim.  Conversely, many 120
American Muslims turn to the internet in order to discover like-minded communities 
outside of physicality to help them understand themselves in relation to their faith. 
Websites such as Twitter, Tumblr, and Reddit are common places where Muslims debate 
theology amongst themselves, and the websites also operate a safer spaces where some 
Muslim sub-communities can express thoughts less understand in mainstream American 
Muslim culture. LGBTQ Muslims are well-documented on using the internet to forge 
both a uniquely LGBTQ Muslim identity in addition to justifying and reconciling their 
existence within the greater Muslim world.  This digital environment is similarly used 121
by Muslim feminists seeking religious arguments and theological interpretations that can 
argue for a anti-patriarchal or pro-feminist interpretation of the Qur’an.  
 The digital environment can then also reinforce or subvert some ideas of authority 
while supplementing and strengthening others.  Certain American Muslim subsets will 122
discover Western Islamic scholars that argue for a feminist hermeneutic of the Qur’an and 
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will attribute them with more authority in how to better read the Qur’an within a certain 
lens. Other American Muslims will encounter unofficial theorists who use Islam as a lens 
to push back against a perceived Western capitalist neoliberalism and will incorporate 
their arguments into their own beliefs on Islam’s duty for society. The complexity of 
American Muslim authority is inherently derived from the fact that there is no one single 
American Muslim community, and therefore no one majority thought on how authority 
can be derived and validated.  
 Yet, since American Muslim communities exist under a largely similar cultural 
and legal circumstances, some questions arise from this complex knot of identity that the 
American Muslim world finds itself engaging with. First of all, unlike Egypt or Saudi 
Arabia, the United States is not historically founded on Islamic principles or any religious 
law in particular. Due to cultural history and military interactions, much of the greater 
Sunni Muslim world also sees the United States as an occasional ally and occasional 
adversary.  By living in the United States and (at least partially) assimilating, can 123
American Muslims properly experience their Islamic faith and submit theories of 
authority in that environment? Thinkers such as Qutb would drastically argue against the 
idea that Muslims can live in a non-Muslim culture and still maintain their abstract status 
as Muslim. However, American Muslims have seen no problems as viewing their 
existence as a natural tension, whether through assimilation or rejection of specific 
American cultural norms despite their lives centered in the United States.  
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 Of course, within that idea, American Muslims are culturally expected to 
assimilate and adopt the “melting pot” that is American culture.  This creates its own 124
sets of issues because American culture is based on a very specific set of secularizing 
norms while still assuming immigrants will effect the overall culture. Therefore, can 
Islam as a religion and its cultural influences be separated while assimilating? Some 
would obviously argue yes, as the pop-up success of products like hummus, falafal, 
shwarma, and general halal delis have had no issue within the American culture. Yet, 
American culture also is well reported as generally Islamophobic and more distinctly 
Islamic practices such as zakkat and salah and Ramadan are often misunderstood and 
looked at as undesirable practices to be assimilated into American culture.  
 Muslims in the United States are also in a position where authority must 
constantly be recreated and reclaimed specifically because there is no endemic Islamic 
cultural apparatus. Despite the long history of Islam within the United States, Islam does 
not have a nationally recognized fiqh council that can pronounce fatwas on behalf of 
American Muslims nor is there any currently successful attempt to create one. The 
secular government structure of the United States further complicates this issue, as each 
state is subject to its own laws and regulations, all fifty of which have their own policies 
towards religious practice and constitutionality. While there are broad overlaps between 
states, states separated far enough by geography and with different American Muslim 
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communities may face different issues and complications that a national fiqh policy might 
be unable to address.  
 The American Muslim community also exists in the cultural wake of the 
September 11 attacks, which has polarized many parts of American on the mere idea of 
Islam as a religion that exists within the United States. Hate crimes against perceived 
“Muslims”, which may be anything from South Asians to Arabs to Sikhs to actual 
Muslims, have skyrocketed over the past twenty years.  American domestic policy 125
towards American Muslim communities can be defined as “generally problematic.” In 
this cultural climate, many American Muslim communities could see authority within the 
community based on opposition to the United States and practices that reject current 
discourse in the United States. This is distinct from grounding authority in the traditional 
Islamic theology and Islamic science, although still a legitimate form of authority 
creation. However, this method does lead to a potentiality that authority within these 
communities, whether religiously or culturally Muslim, will be formed on the principles 
of opposition to the status quo, regardless of what that means for the community at large.  
 However, the American Muslim authority model does present a model that could 
be easily exported and embraced by other nations with a rich religious diversity and 
multiple denominations of Islam within its borders. Part of the allure of the American 
Muslim construct is simply that there is the need for growth and change and no clear 
structures on what that is. The identity marker of “Muslim” is the concrete thread that 
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connects these disparate communities and ideologies even within a national border. This 
authority construct then only requires that the community agree that someone has the 
right to call themselves “Muslim” rather than working to establish what exactly a Muslim 
is. The model would allow for more multi-cultural Sunni Muslim communities to come to 
agreement on broad strokes and then to influence each other on more detailed aspects of 
the faith and how it is constructed within communities. Yet, this may also be a lesson that 
Sunni-majority and Sunni-plurality nations can be influenced by and incorporate into 
their own authority models specifically because it is easily formatted to the local culture 
and context of Islam itself. The real question is if these various nations will be willing to 
listen to the advice of the American Muslim authority model and if the American Muslim 
model will be willing to listen in return.  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Chapter Six: Communication Between Authority Constructions 
 Of course, within these ideas of authority, it is important to note and understand 
that Islamic authority is not created or circumscribed within a vacuum. Islam, despite its 
description or assumption as a religion tied to a specific geographical region, is a religion 
that exists across multiple continents and multiple peoples. These various Islams are 
often in discussion and conversation with each other, influenced by regional thinkers and 
theorists who play off of each other, read each other’s works, and disagree adamantly on 
occasion. This also then means that their understandings and prescriptions are better seen 
as different theories vying for voice in Muslim communities.  
 For example, the near-anarchical model of Islamic authority espoused by Sayyid 
Qutb is clearly rejected by the statist model of Saudi Arabia via Wahhabi-Salafism. Qutb 
believed that Islamic authority was specifically the purview of God and that leaders, at 
their best, were merely stewards for the authority of God. If the physical leader began to 
fail or not properly implement the shariah, then it was not just a Muslim’s right but their 
duty to remove the communal legitimacy granted to that leader and overthrow them, 
freeing the position for someone who actually would fulfill the promises of God.  126
Meanwhile, the general Islamic jurisprudence within Saudi Arabia specifically would 
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argue for the opposite. In order for a Wahhabi-Salafi model to exist, the idea of 
overthrowing leaders was paramount to heresy itself. Their interpretation of the Qur’an 
was that Muslims had next-to-no right to overthrow or in any way rebel against their 
leaders.  They had a selective right to occasionally inform and advise their leader and 127
ruler, but the leader was never explicitly stated as needing to listen or adhere to the advice 
of his citizens. Instead, it was the ruler’s job to properly enforce the practice of Islam and 
to ensure the continuing space for Islam to flourish. In fact, it was a far worse crime to 
ignore the prescriptions of the Muslim ruler than it was to try to enforce the community’s 
beliefs upon the leader.  128
 Now, Qutb’s theory pushes heavily against the modern iterations of the Saudi 
Wahhabi-Salafi religious establishment. The very prescription Qutb creates for Muslims 
around the world is in direct opposition to the theorizing from Saudi Arabia’s clerics. 
Moreover, Qutb’s philosophy threatens the very idea of Saudi Arabia’s existence from a 
religious security sphere. A philosophy explicitly based on the idea that the leader of a 
nation state, in fact the idea of national leaders at all, was a flawed Western idea that 
would never significantly remove jahiliyah from global Muslim communities would not 
be received well by the Saudi government. In contrast, the idea that Muslims were not to 
question their rulers and leader and instead were expected to offer obedience in all things 
does not reflect well in an ideology like Qutb’s. To assert that the path to a pure Islamic 
community was through the establishment of physical Islamic leaders rather than by 
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removing physical human Muslim leaders is its own philosophical model of authority 
construction. Meanwhile the circumstances of Muslims that lived in the United States 
would appall and be condemned by both Qutb and Sheikh bin Baz.  
 For Qutb, American Muslims would be living in a nation not run by the ideals of 
the shariah and the hakimiyah. They suffered to live in a non-Islamic nation, operating 
under the cultural and legal influences of man-made law rather than that of God’s natural 
law. For Sheikh bin Baz and the Wahhabi-Salafi model, the American Muslim has no 
Muslim leader to follow and obey. They continually participate in a process that leads 
them into risk of shirk by choosing to hold onto ideals such as the American constitution 
simply by existing as American Muslims rather than rejecting their identity as Americans. 
And of course, for both thinkers, American Muslims are in opposition specifically 
because they choose to exist as Muslims within the anti-Islamic West. Therefore, no 
matter the logic or rationale behind their betrayal, their existence as Western Muslims can 
potentially invalidate their Muslim status without any other specific acts. 
 American Muslims also embody a specific crisis within the need for Islamic 
authority construction. Since no Muslim nation in the current order can entirely segregate 
itself with exclusively Muslim peoples and nations, the issue of secularism and outside 
influences will always remain an aspect of Islamic practice. This secular influence then in 
some ways creates a need to form consensus on what specifically can be considered 
Islamic and what is not. Some theorists would argue that Islamic authority comes 
exclusively from the Qur’an and a metaphysical Islamic backing. Under that logic, 
anything created and theorized from the non-Muslim world cannot be imported and must 
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be independently created by Muslims for Muslims. Meanwhile, many other theorists 
argue that life aspects such as science, agriculture, and general natural science knowledge 
is innately human and cannot be segregated into “Islamic” and “non-Islamic.” It is 
Islamic morality and Islamic understanding of the world as a spiritual cosmic whole that 
must be maintained, not an assumed Muslim purity about products such as WiFi or 
Starbucks. Authority construction can also easily shift based on the circumstances of 
specific theorists or communities, specifically because in Sunni Islam authority is created 
by consensus. Western Muslims may be far more willing to accept ideas such as 
feminism or LGBTQ equality as value-neutral and not the pure purview of the non-
Muslim world, whereas more “traditional” Muslims may instead argue that those 
philosophies are corrupting importations meant to separate Muslims from the true 
interpretation of Islam and the Qur’an.  
 In addition, Islamic authority can also be influenced by the political needs of the 
cultures and areas, or even informed by their circumstances. It is not irrelevant that 
Sayyid Qutb’s theorization came from the wake of formerly colonized Egypt. Qutb’s 
Egypt had been dominated by the British and French, the religious establishment co-
opted in order to spread what he saw as Western propaganda, and suffering from a dearth 
of truly Muslim leaders.  Secular generals and kings influenced by the West ruled in 129
Egypt in the early and mid 20th century, and Qutb instead envisioned a world where the 
leaders of Muslims would indeed be Muslims in practice as well as name. American 
 Soage. "Islamism and Modernity." 189-203.129
!63
Muslims exist within the cultural context of geographically separate and yet connected by 
their shared faith. American Muslims, however, still exist within a matrix of identity, and 
not as a monolithic community that has one set of needs or desires. Black American 
Muslims have very different cultural circumstances and economic resources than 
immigrant American Muslims who may not suffer from endemic institutionalized anti-
black racism. Yet conversely, Black American Muslims are much less likely to suffer 
from Islamophobic actions and policies that predominantly effect immigrant Muslim 
communities.  The American Muslim community is a patchwork set of communities 130
and therefore has no one true idea of authority, but instead an authority matrix which ebbs 
and flows based on the needs of any specific community within the United States. Saudi 
Arabia may be seeking to extend its Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine beyond the confines of 
Saudi Arabia and the Hijaz in an attempt to increase allyship within the Muslim world. 
Sunni Islam is broadly based on consensus within the community and the desire for 
Wahhabi satellite communities could come from the Saudi state’s needs being addressed 
by its Wahhabi-Salafi establishment counterparts.  
 The effort to understand a subset of Sunni Muslim constructions of authority in 
the modern era comes from the central tension within Islam itself. Islam is a monotheism 
based on the premise that Muhammad is the last of God’s prophets. There will be no 
further prophet to expound and recite God’s advice and laws to humanity. Therefore, if 
the last speaker for God is a man who died in 632 CE how does the Muslim community 
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seek growth and transformation in line with the temporal space it occupies? For Islam, 
the answer is islah and tajdid, reform and renewal. According to the theological precepts, 
Islam has no need for further prophets, further revealers of divine knowledge, specifically 
because the faith is eternally relevant. For Muslim theorists, the understanding of Islam 
and its implementation properly into human society will prove a better or worse society. 
The argument is that if your people are properly following the laws and knowledge of the 
Qur’an and shariah then your society will get better in measurable, understandable ways. 
Within a single human lifetime, a society will reflect its acceptance or withdrawal of 
Islamic precepts. This is why the question of who exactly can be considered an authority 
is relevant yet never fixed. The society’s authority can simultaneously stimulate growth 
even as they may create more circumstances that complicate people’s lives. These 
authority models can also reveal the problems currently entrenched within specific 
populations and how they can be replicated to the greater Muslim whole. 
 Now, none of the authority models discussed here are the exclusive purview of a 
single nation, community, or even Muslim person. The thoughts of Qutb, the fatwas of 
Sheik bin Baz, even the overlapping and often contradictory authority models of the 
American Muslim communities are merely three of the authority models in the modern 
Muslim world. Yet while there are others, these are three of the authority models that 
continue to hold and maintain influence across the Muslim world, not simply the 
localities where these authority models arose or were constructed. These authority models 
are influential also because they address three very specific issues in ways that other 
authority models may not. In the 21st century, seemingly new standards of society are 
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falling away or transforming into radically new versions. Qutb addresses the growing 
conflict against the nation-state model pushed through colonialism and the early modern 
era. The Wahhabi-Salafi model exemplified through the theorizing of Sheikh bin Baz 
speaks to the draw and complexity that comes from a religious community that spans 
multiple continents and dozens of countries. The American Muslim community reveals 
the issues and possible complications of a multi-cultural community within a locality, 
even if everyone is identified as Muslim. Further, these ideas of authority are fluid and 
continue to influence Muslims the world over specifically because they are fluid.  
 Authority within theology is a fluid foundation specifically because it never exists 
as a singular pillar. Authority is a process that is dependent on the relationship between 
leaders, political and religious, and their constituents. Authority models can also grant a 
method for Muslims to achieve greater theological agency in the modern age. These 
constructions reveal an implicit permission for these leaders and theorists through their 
assuming authority. This then also allows for models to conflict and push against each 
other in order to remove authority from those leaders no longer accepted or to supplement 
the authority of certain leaders because they are seen as authentic and true in their 
ambitions. The authority models also, no matter how flawed or complicated they may 
seem, create legitimacy and standards with the Muslim communities both domestic and 
internationally. These leaders then actually have methods to address the problems that 
afflict their community, continuing the cycle.  
 Of course they also have different solutions to these problems, and even overlap. 
Qutbi thought pushes for a radical new worldview where all Muslims reject the ignorance 
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of the not-Islam and fully embrace Islam as a closed worldview. The modern Wahhabi-
Salafi thought seeks to espouse its theology to Muslim world, working to remove the 
possibility on non-Islamic ideals infringing on Islamic practice through a mosaic 
mentality. It is not a closed worldview but a cautious and ever-vigilant worldview instead. 
The American Muslim worldview works from a third sphere, looking to allow a 
kaleidoscope of theories and thoughts that do not work entirely against each other but not 
entirely with each other. They create a natural tensions that pushes ideas to the forefront 
of discussion within the community itself, even if there is no clean resolution. These 
authority models are not meant to offer dogmatic arguments that must be adhered to 
sentence by sentence. Instead, the attempt to offer more holistic world-views and 
foundational principles that will allow leaders to continue to maintain and justify their 
authority whether politically, physically, or philosophically.  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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 Sunni Islam in the modern era is facing a unique set of challenges. For a 
denomination quite literally named after the idea of community consensus, the theoretical 
Sunni community is in a state of flux. The advent of group literacy, Qur’anic translations, 
and the digital realm has allowed for once marginal voices to become much louder and 
able to be heard. The supposedly traditional authority models from previous ages have 
fallen away, and communities have been left to decide on models of authority and their 
integration into the communities. However, this flux state should not be seen as 
synonymous with a state of chaos or even a state of confusion. This flux state should also 
not be seen as a temporary state, a process moving these communities towards a single 
polity where an authority model is universally acknowledged and followed. These Sunni 
communities are instead seeking a valuable process of authority transformation and re-
centering authority in the tradition of tajdid and islah. These multiple authority 
constructions are all seeking to reform and renew the Islamic faith. The differences come 
from the fact that Sunni communities do not face the same challenges and often seek 
different paths to answer the pressures of the modern era.  
 These different authority models seek specific answers to specific questions 
within their communities, even if they can be exported and reformatted to other locations 
and communities. The professionally educated, anti-establishment is often an answer for 
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communities who feel betrayed, let down, or simply ignored by the elite religious 
apparatus that is supposed to address their religious concerns. The state-religion authority 
cooperation is often the result from states that need a religious foundation in the Islamic 
tradition and a clerical elite that seeks a method to guarantee their authority’s ability to be 
implemented without infringement. The Muslim community as Muslim identity is from 
the Sunni experience of cultural diversity while still operating as a minority population 
within a larger nation. These authority models are not the only models that exist within 
the larger Sunni world, but they are three specific models that continue to last and 
influence Sunni communities. Their longevity is because they are largely able to make 
substantial, applicable arguments on how their specific constituencies are to handle the 
pressures placed upon them.  
 This is not to claim that they are without flaws or without their own complications 
and further questions, but they address specific questions for Sunni communities in a 
method that seems authentic and logical for those communities. These answers influence 
Sunni Muslim lives and religious practice, further engendering their theory into the 
community itself. These authority models also survive and continue to gain traction in 
communities because they are fluid constructs that can be more easily formatted for 
future questions and ideas. Authority is by necessity a ongoing and negotiated 
relationship between those that claim authority and those that accept that authority. The 
diversity of Sunni practices and Sunni communities means that there is no need or desire 
to create a single, homogenous identity that can exclusively claim approval and authority 
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over the community’s religious practice. The diversity of Sunnis is instead what fosters 
the different paths for authority construction itself. 
 As stated before, Sunni authority is in a state of flux and many interpret that flux 
as a crisis, a bug of Sunni tradition rather than a feature. Sunni communities do not have 
a single problem anymore than there is a single Sunni community. The idea of consensus 
continues to hold true within these communities, and should be seen as true in turn. Many 
understandings of consensus pretend that consensus is spawned instantaneously, without 
discussion or argument or disagreement. These authority constructions are attempts to 
reform and renew Islam within communities specifically because the community is 
seeking a reformation of authority. The reformation through transformation and re-
centering of authority allows Sunni communities to present different paths forward that 
can be seen and eventually placed in conversation with each other. These paths may 
answer different questions for Sunni communities, but these paths also reveal the internal 
diversity of Sunni traditions as its own systematic feature rather than another bug. The 
internal diversity is what allows these authority models to grow and shift even throughout 
their own lifespan, continuing to answering new questions presented by the community. 
Sunni authority construction is in flux because the Sunni community is in flux. The fact 
that these three models continue to hold influence within Sunni communities is not 
because they seek to solidify that constant fluidity, but instead embrace it as the needed 
future. In other words, the only path worth embracing is the path of change, for the good 
of the community and the good of all.  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